Abstract. Formal methods have a great potential of application as powerful speci cation and early debugging methods in the development of industrial systems. In certain application elds, formal methods are even becoming part of standards. However, the application of formal methods in the development of industrial products is by no means trivial. Indeed, formal methods can be costly, slow down the process of development, and require changes on the development cycle, and training. This paper describes a project developed by Ansaldo Segnalamento Ferroviario with the collaboration of IRST. Formal methods have been successfully applied to the development of an industrial communication protocol for distributed, safety critical systems. The project used a formal language to specify the protocol, and model checking techniques to validate the model.
Introduction
Formal methods have a great potential of application as powerful speci cation and early debugging methods in the development of industrial systems 2]. In certain application elds, formal methods are even becoming part of standards 1, 4] . However, the application of formal methods in the development of industrial products is by no means trivial. Indeed, formal methods can be costly, slow down the process of development, and require changes on the development cycle, and training.
This paper describes a project developed by Ansaldo Segnalamento Ferroviario (Asf) with the collaboration of IRST, where formal methods have been successfully applied to the development of an industrial communication protocol, called Safety Layer. The Safety Layer is used to present to safety-critical applicative software point-to-point, dependable channels, implemented over a double eld bus. The design of such a protocol is a very complex task. A previous implementation, developed without the assistance of formal methods, required an expensive activity of debugging on the eld, and was di cult to maintain and extend. On the other hand, the protocol was chosen (for its good qualities in safety and dependability) as the communication basis of several computerbased, distributed safety-critical products under development in Asf. Formal 
Informal description of the Safety Layer
The Safety Layer is a communication protocol intended to provide reliable communication for distributed safety critical systems, e.g. Automatic Train Control systems, track-to-train communication systems, interlocking systems. Typically, such systems are based on several computing stations connected via eld bus.
The Safety Layer provides applicative programs (running on di erent units) with point to point communication channels. Figure 1 depicts applicative programs A, B and C, running on di erent units, connected by point-to-point bidirectional channels AB and BC. Such channels are protected against data corruption and out-of-order reception by means of CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Checksum) protection, authentication mechanisms, sequence numbering andnal shutdown in presence of repeated errors. The interface to the application The Safety Layer is con gured o -line, i.e. the applicative-level channels are xed at design time.
Besides guaranteeing the safety of communication channels to the applicative programs, the role of the Safety Layer is to enhance dependability, i.e. to make the channels available for the applicative programs as much as possible. Therefore, each unit running the Safety Layer is connected to two independent eld buses. The ProFiBus 8] drivers provide the Safety Layer with connectionoriented communication primitives. The role of the Safety Layer is to hide this redundancy from the application program, which only can see a reliable communication channel. The Safety Layer tries to maintain two connections, one per ProFiBus, for each point-to-point channel to the application level. In Figure 1, the channel AB between applicatives A and B is realized through the two connections AB1 and AB2. In the case of nominal behavior of the protocol, one connection is active, through which data can be transmitted, while the other is in standby. (Notationally, the former is called the active connection, while the latter is called the backup connection.) Even when no data is transmitted, a minimum rate of transmission is guaranteed on both connections, by means of special control telegrams, called connection monitoring. This mechanism is used to reduce the time needed to detect problems, such as disturbance on the bus, or malfunctioning of hardware components. Such problems may be revealed by messages with corrupted CRC or out-of-order sequence numbers, or by timeouts.
When a problem arises on the backup bus, the backup connection is reset, and the reconnection procedure is retried. The active connection is not a ected. The protocol can thus work properly in a degraded mode, when only one connection is available, but this is completely hidden to the applicative program.
If a problem arises on the active connection, and the backup connection is working properly, then the switch-over procedure is undertaken. The switch-over is a distinguishing mechanism of the protocol. When a switch-over occurs, the backup connection becomes active, and will be used to transmit applicative data, while the (previously) active connection is reset and restarted in standby.
The project
The Safety Layer is a very complicated protocol. A previous implementation had been built with traditional software development methods, for a particular redunded architecture. This activity had been troublesome, and had resulted in high costs in development and maintainability.
Requirements
The Safety Layer protocol, presented in previous section, is the basis for several computer-based, distributed safety-critical products under development in Asf.
The main requirement of the project was to provide a detailed, operational speci cation of the Safety Layer, describing the state machines realizing the protocol. This speci cation is a direct input to the implementation of the protocol, and the state variables speci ed in the model are to be implemented exactly as speci ed. This direct link between speci cation and implementation was required to enhance the maintainability of the protocol, and its reusability in subsequent applications. Furthermore, the speci cation should consider as legal the behaviors generated by the previous implementation of the Safety Layer. Finally, it was required that the time for the speci cation of the Safety Layer should not be too long, in order not to delay the implementation and thus impact on the projects where the Safety Layer had to be used.
Phases
The project was carried out in 10 months, along the following stages. First, an analysis of the protocol requirements was carried out. This task was particularly heavy, due to the large incompleteness in the documentation of the rst implementation, and its dependence on the hardware architecture. As a result of this phase, a distinction was carried out between the aspects which should be formally analyzed, and the ones which were clear enough to be informally speci ed.
Then, a preliminary model was developed, where the ProFiBus was assumed not to corrupt but only lose data, i.e. transmission errors were not taken into account. In this stage, a crucial design choice was taken to structure the Safety Layer by introducing an intermediate level. This choice allowed to partition the complexity of the design problem, and resulted in a much clearer and manageable design. In the nal stage, the protocol speci cation was extended to take into account the details of the transmission error. This phase required a substantial complication of (some of) the state machines. However, the modi cation to be applied to the model generated in the previous phase were uniform, and thus simple to realize.
Methodology
The methodology applied in this project was heavily based on formal methods. The ObjectGEODE tool was thoroughly applied in the project. Object-GEODE is a commercial tool for the development of real-time distributed systems, based on formal methods. It allows to specify the system to be analyzed by means of SDL. A translator from StateCharts to SDL allows to obtain skeletons for SDL programs from high-level description of state machines. Requirements can be expressed by means of MSC's, or via observer automata expressed in a programming language. An explicit state model checker is directly connected to the SDL, and allows to exhaustively analyze nite state systems.
In this project, StateCharts were used to provide high level, pictorial representation of the nite state machines realizing the protocol. SDL was used to provide a precise, executable speci cation of the machines. The ObjectGEODE model checker was applied to reduce the development time, by pointing out a large number of problems in intermediate versions of the design. MSC were generated via simulation to provide an easy-to-understand description of behaviors.
Formal speci cation of the Safety Layer
The design speci cations were produced in form of an SDL model. An SDL model of a system is described by a hierarchy of diagrams. In the top diagram (interconnection diagram) the system is decomposed into building blocks; each block is connected to other blocks and to the environment by channels; channels and blocks are interfaced by gates; each SDL channel is labeled by a couple of message lists, which describe the sets of messages which can be sent in the two directions. In a lower level of interconnection diagrams, each block is decomposed into a set of processes, which are interconnected by routes. In the further lower level of the hierarchy, each process is exploded into a set of transition diagrams, which represents (the SDL code of) the state machine of the process. This code can be executed by the ObjectGEODE simulator.
Safety Layer = CM + 2 SL
The Safety Layer allows in principle to handle several channels to di erent units. For instance, channels AB and BC are handled by the central Safety Layer block in Figure 1 . However, since there are no interactions between di erent channels on the same Safety Layer, it is possible to consider only the problem of specifying the management of a single channel. This means to \ ll" a box with a port to the applicative program, and two ports to the ProFiBus drivers. The internal structure of such box is presented in Figure 2 , in the form of SDL interconnection diagram.
The system is decomposed into three blocks: an upper block \Connection Manager" (CM) CM A and two lower identical blocks \Safety Layer" (SL) A1 and A2. (For compatibility with the notation used in other Asf documents, the expression \Safety Layer" has been used to denote both the whole system and the lower blocks; to avoid ambiguities, from now on we will denote The idea is thus to hierarchically decompose the protocol in three components. The rationale behind the decomposition is that each SL machine is able to handle a single connection, and is not even aware of the existence of the other SL machine. The CM is not aware of the details of the status of the SL machines. On the other hand, the CM has a clear view of the redundancy of the channel, and enforces control on the SL machines according to the events which are signaled by them.
In this way, it was possible to specify independently the SL and CM machines. This allowed to partition the speci cation problem, and make it possible to contain the number of states in each machine. The model checker was invaluable in the task of pointing out the bad interactions between them. Furthermore, the blocks A1 and A2 are implemented as two instances of the same process type. This means that the resulting system is conceptually simpler, the code can be heavily factored, and thus it is easier to maintain.
Finally, the SL and CM machines are asynchronously composed in the nal system. This is a precise design choice of the model. Once the protocol is validated without constraints on the order of execution of its component machines, it is possible to choose, in the implementation phase, any possible algorithm of activation of the SL and CM machines. The model has been designed to reduce as much as possible the unnecessary constraints on the implementation level.
Overview of the CM machine
The executable SDL model of the machines was integrated with a set of high level, abstract StateCharts, which were used as a graphical roadmap for the speci cation. Figure 3 represents (a simpli ed view of) the CM machine. The name of each state is in the form <s1>A <s2>R, where <s1> represents the state of the active connection and <s2> represents the state of the backup one. A couple of pointers keep track of which is the active SL and which is the backup one. The states are grouped into three distinct macro-states, each representing an operating mode of the channel.
Non-operative. It (synchronization of the backup connection), DataA StartR and dataA WcR (setup of the backup connection). Only the active connection is set; the CM tries to set up also the backup connection. The two stations can exchange data along the active connection; if no data telegram is to be sent, the active connection is monitored by sending connection monitoring (CM) telegrams. If the active connection is dropped, the channel becomes non-operative, as there is no backup connection.
Operative (with backup). It involves only the state DataA StandbyR. Both the active and backup connection are set. The two stations can exchange data along the active connection; if no data are to be sent, the active connection is monitored by sending connection monitoring (CM) telegrams; the backup connection is also periodically monitored by sending CM telegrams. If the active connection is dropped, the backup connection becomes active (switch-over) and the channel keeps operative (without backup). The transitions are grouped into eight main functionalities:
(1) Re-synchronization of the active (resp. backup) connection. From the initial state IdleA IdleR (resp. DataA IdleR), before starting the setup of the active (resp. backup) connection, the CM enters the state SyncA IdleR (resp. DataA SyncR) where it waits for a xed amount of time. During this period all the commands coming from both connections (resp. from the backup connection) are discharged. This removes all the information related to the previous connection and leaves enough time to the remote station to detect the disconnection and to drop the connection too. After the re-synchronization period, the CM enters the state StartA IdleR (resp. DataA StartR).
(2,3) Connection Setup These transitions allow the CM to set up new connections. The modalities depend on the CM (whether it is initializer or not), and on the connection (whether it is to be active or backup).
(4,5) Data send and receive. The CM is in one of the operative channel states (DataA XxxxR) When it receives a data slot to send from the application, it sends a data command to the active SL and waits. When the CM receives the data con rm command, it provides a con rmation to the application. When it receives a data indication command from the active SL, it passes to the application the data slot received. 
(2)
(7) (1) Connection setup (initializer side Figure 4 are called instead the main states.)
An example of transition diagram
To provide an example of an SDL process diagram, in Figure 5 we report the SDL description of the functionality (8) of the SL \Switch-over from ProFiBus".
(Notationally, as it is standard practice in protocol theory 9], the service primitives of the protocols |called \commands" here| have been classi ed into request (.req), indication (.ind), response (.resp) and con rm (.cnf) commands. The SDL notation is rather intuitive and will be clear in the description below.) By \the SL receives correctly a telegram" we will mean that the SL receives a telegram, it tests both the CRC and the sequence number of the telegram and the result is positive (condition Crc#seq ok); by \the SL sends correctly a telegram" we will mean that the SL sends the telegram and waits in a proper acknowledgment state \ ACK" until it receives a pb ack. (The unsuccessful send and receipt of telegrams are described in other diagrams.) The procedure call SL resetpars at the end of the transitions resets the values of the elds of input telegrams and commands; it will be ignored in the description. A state labeled with \{" means \the previous state". The timers timer CMt, timer CMr and timer cr check respectively the connection monitoring |transmission and reception| and the acknowledgment of the telegrams CR, CC, A1 and SOI, as described above. The transitions represented in Figure 5 can be described as follows: 1. The SL is in the state STANDBY (backup connection) and receives correctly via ProFiBus a switch-over indication telegram SOI. Thus it resets all timers (procedure call Reset Timers), it sends to the CM a switch-over indication command Saf SO.ind and waits for a reply in the state WFSO RESP. 2. When the CM replies with a switch-over response command Saf SO.resp, the SL sets the timers timer CMt and timer CMr to some proper values, sends successfully via ProFiBus a switch-over acknowledgment telegram SOA and system modello USE terminale_lib; 3. It may be the case that, in the state WFSO RESP, the SL receives from the CM a switch-over request command Saf SO.resp (double switch-over). If so, the SL sets timer cr to a proper value, it sends successfully the switch-over indication telegram SOI waiting in WFSO RESP both the switch-over response command from the CM and the telegram SOA from the remote SL. (This happens in case of double switch-over, if the telegram SOA is received after the command Saf SO.resp.) If so, the SL behaves exactly as in the previous situation.
Formal Validation
During the project, interactive and exhaustive simulations were performed on the model con gured as depicted in Figure 6 . (In this model each block is built by one single process; thus from now on we will use the words \block" and \process" as synonyms.) The model represents a point-to-point channel AB between two partner stations A and B. The station A consists on a CM block CM A and two SL blocks A1 and A2; the station B consists on a CM block CM B and two SL blocks B1 and B2. (The names of the gates and of the message lists are analogous to the ones in Figure 2 .) A1 and B1 (resp. A2 and B2) exchange telegrams through the connection AB1 (resp. AB2), which they setup and monitor. A1 and A2 exchange telegrams with B1 and B2 respectively by means of a block PB AB12 representing the ProFiBus layer. PB AB12 is a non-deterministic process: when one of the SL process sends a telegram, PB AB12 can either send the telegram to the partner SL process and return pb ack to the source SL, or return pb nak to the source SL without sending the telegram to the partner SL. The development and validation of the model has been a cyclic process: at each cycle the model was simulated by running the simulator/model checker of ObjectGEODE in both interactive and exhaustive mode; the errors or anomalous behaviors revealed were traced by means of MSC's and analyzed; then a new version of the model was produced which included the modi cations suggested by the analysis. All simulations have been performed on a SUN SPARC10 workstation with 128MB RAM.
Interactive simulation
The rst step of every simulation cycle was to run the simulator in interactive mode, in order to verify by hand the nominal behavior of the system and some typical scenarios. For instance, we have simulated interactively standard so_double saf_disc.ind ( true,false,pid(a2!sl (1)) ) saf_so.req ( pid(a1!sl (1)) ) saf_so.cnf ( pid(a1!sl (1) (1)) ) saf_so.cnf ( pid(b1!sl (1)) ) saf_disc.ind ( true,false,pid(b2!sl (1)) ) inst_1_cm_a.cm
inst_1_cm_b.cm PROCESS /modello /cm_b/cm(1) Fig. 7 . The MSC of the double switch-over.
situations like setup of both active and backup connection, data and connection monitoring exchange, drop of active and/or backup connection, single and double switch-over, plus some scenarios of typical error handling (CRC errors, ProFiBus errors, channel delays, etc.). The corresponding MSC's have been produced and analyzed.
As an example, the MSC so double of Figure 7 describes the execution of a scenario of double switch-over. The MSC notation is rather intuitive: the vertical lines represent, from left to right, the seven blocks/processes CM A, A1, A2, PB AB12, B1, B2 and CM B; the arrows represent the messages exchanged. The MSC has been obtained by simulating interactively the nal version of the model. At the starting point, the channel is operative with backup, AB2 is the active connection and AB1 the backup one, so that CM A, CM B are in DataA StandbyR, A2, B2 are in DATA and A1, B1 are in STANDBY. (In the following description all telegrams are sent with success, so that we omit to mention the pb ack messages; we also omit the description of the values of the elds of the commands and telegrams because they are not relevant in this context.) Each active SL A2 and B2 reveals a problem on the active connection (e.g., a failed connection monitoring). Then it informs its own CM with a disconnection indication command Saf DISC.ind. Each CM starts the switch-over phase by sending a switch-over request command Saf SO.req to its own backup SL. The latter sends via ProFiBus a switch-over indication telegram SOI and waits for the switch-over acknowledge telegram SOA. Instead it receives rst the SOI telegram from the other SL (double switch-over) and simply replies with a SOA. When it nally receives the SOA, it informs its own CM by a switch-over con rm command saf SO.cnf. Then each CM swaps the roles of its SL's. The connection AB1 is now the active one, and the CM can start the setup of the backup connection AB2.
Model checking
The second step of every simulation cycle was to run the simulator in exhaustive mode (model checking). This was a very e ective form of early debugging for the system, as the model checker found automatically a large number of errors or unexpected behaviors. Furthermore, most of these problems were of such a complicate nature to be nearly impossible for a human analyst to conceive. (1)) ) saf_so.req ( pid(b1!sl (1)) ) saf_so.resp ( pid(b1!sl(1)) ) saf_disc.ind ( true,false,pid(b2!sl (1) The MSC derived from the error scenario generated is reported in the MSC of Figure 8 . (The starting conditions and the assumptions are the same as for the MSC so double of Figure 7 .) The active SL A2 reveals a problem on the active connection and informs CM A with a disconnection indication command Saf DISC.ind. CM A sends a switch-over request command Saf SO.req to its own backup SL A1, which sends via ProFiBus a switch-over indication telegram SOI to the remote SL B1. B1 informs CM B by a switch-over indication command Saf SO.ind, and waits for the switch-over response command Saf SO.resp in the state WFSO RESP ( rst transition of Figure 5 ). In the meanwhile also the SL B2 reveals a problem on the active connection and informs CM B with a disconnection indication command Saf DISC.ind; CM B reacts by sending a switch-over request command Saf SO.req to B1. B1 receives the Saf SO.req and sends via ProFiBus a telegram SOI to A1 (third transition of Figure 5 ). CM B replies to the command Saf SO.ind with a switch-over response command Saf SO.resp. B1 receives it, sends via ProFiBus a telegram SOA and enters the state DATA (second transition of Figure 5 ). A1 replies to the SOI with a telegram SOA. Unfortunately |as the last couple of transitions of Figure 5 is missing| B1 is not prepared to receive a telegram SOA in the state DATA. This causes an error.
Notice that the error happens because the Saf SO.ind and the Saf SO.req \cross" between B1 and CM B, so that B1 receives the Saf SO.req in between the exchange Saf SO.ind/Saf SO.resp. In an implemented version of the system, it is reasonable to assume that the communications between CM and SL are much faster than those via ProFiBus, so that the probability of a similar crossing is very low. Therefore this error would have been extremely hard to detect during the testing phase of the implemented system.
Final validation
We focus now on three very intensive exhaustive simulations we performed of the nal version of the model. No transition has been ltered, so that all functionalities are analyzed. Using the state compression allowed by the model checker, we could impose a bound of 3 10 6 reachable states. 1 In the rst two simulations the model checker was run with a breadth-rst search strategy, starting from the situations \channel non operative" and \channel operative with backup" respectively; in the third simulation the model checker was run with a depth-rst search strategy. Each simulation required several hours of CPU time.
